On Fri, Nov 18, 2022 at 6:25 AM Charles Brown
Obama modified Bush preemptive doctrine
Pre-emption was the defining aspect of President Bush's approach to foreign policy, one prompted by the attacks of 9/11 and one which culminated in the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
President Obama has stepped back. You can see this in the difference in wording between the document just issued and the one from President Bush in 2006. US presidents are required by Congress to produce these documents of doctrine every four years.
ADVERTISEMENT In 2006, George Bush's doctrine said: " We do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur... We cannot afford to stand idly by... This is the principle and logic of pre-emption."
In 2010, President Obama, in a specific paragraph called "Use of Force" says: "While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can... when force is necessary we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy..."
Unilateralism
This last, rather tortuous phrase, means that the US will seek international legitimacy (through the UN or Nato, it says) before acting. However, as any American president would, Mr Obama maintains an option to go it alone: "The US must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary."
Image caption, The document strikes a different tone from that of the George W Bush era His refusal to rule out unilateral action has led some to doubt that there is a new doctrine at work here. Foreign Policy magazine says: "The reality is that the new strategy is best characterised as 'Bush Lite', a slightly watered down but basically plausible remake..."
However, the thrust and spirit of the two documents is quite different. George Bush refers to the "War on Terror" and Barack Obama does not. While neither blames Islam for al-Qaeda, one comes close by referring to the "perversion of a proud religion", the other simply has "a far-reaching network of violence and hatred".
Iran differences
Iran is another example. The Bush version made an implicit threat of force if Iran defied the UN, saying: "This diplomatic effort must succeed if confrontation is to be avoided."
Image caption,
President Obama is still fighting a war in Afghanistan
The Obama version is that the US will "work to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon" (even though Iran says it is not doing this and note that the commitment is only to working to prevent, not actually preventing) and that "multiple means" will be employed to this end. "Multiple means" does not rule out force but is some way from threatening it.
Both say that America will "lead" but their leadership is of a different order. The Bush document talks ambitiously about the "ultimate goal of ending tyranny" in the world through the spread of democracy. The Obama one is more modest: "The burden of a young century cannot fall on America's shoulders alone."
And in two key comments the Obama document states: "In the past we have had the foresight to... avoid acting alone". And: "America has not succeeded by stepping outside the currents of international co-operation."
Home front
There has therefore been a toning down of US ambitions and the means by which they should be achieved. President Obama also lays much more stress on getting things right at home.
There is no surprise here. The character of the president will determine American foreign policy. President Obama is different from President Bush. We knew that, from words and deeds. This national security strategy simply confirms it.
This does not mean that President Obama will not fight wars. He is already fighting in Afghanistan. Many American presidents who dislike armed conflict have it thrust upon them - Jimmy Carter felt he had to try to rescue the hostages in Tehran by force, Bill Clinton bombed al-Qaeda camps. What this document does is to try to lay out the framework under which such actions will be taken.
Sent from my iPhone On Nov 17, 2022, at 3:32 PM, Charles Brown
Sent from my iPhone Begin forwarded message: From: Bill Totten
Wolfowitz Doctrine https://en.wikipedia.org (Last edited March 29 2022)
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b0/Paul_Wolfowitz.jpg/440px-Paul_Wolfowitz.jpg
Paul Wolfowitz, sponsor of the doctrine.
Wolfowitz Doctrine is an unofficial name given to the initial version of the Defense Planning Guidance for the 1994~1999 fiscal years (dated February 18 1992) published by US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz and his deputy Scooter Libby. Not intended for public release, it was leaked to The New York Times on March 07 1992 {1} and sparked a public controversy about US foreign and defense policy. The document was widely criticized as imperialist, as the document outlined a policy of unilateralism and pre-emptive military action to suppress potential threats from other nations and prevent dictatorships from rising to superpower status.
Such was the outcry that the document was hastily re-written under the close supervision of US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell before being officially released on April 16 1992. Many of its tenets re-emerged in the Bush Doctrine {2}, which was described by Senator Edward M Kennedy as "a call for 21st century American imperialism that no other nation can or should accept" {3}.
Wolfowitz was ultimately responsible for the Defense Planning Guidance, as it was released through his office and was reflective of his overall outlook. The task of preparing the document fell to Libby, who delegated the process of writing the new strategy to Zalmay Khalilzad, a member of Libby's staff and longtime aide to Wolfowitz. In the initial phase of drafting the document, Khalilzad solicited the opinions of a wide cross-section of Pentagon insiders and outsiders, including Andrew Marshall, Richard Perle, and Wolfowitz's University of Chicago mentor, the nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter {4}. Completing the draft in March 1992, Khalilzad requested permission from Libby to circulate it to other officials within the Pentagon. Libby assented and within three days Khalilzad's draft was released to The New York Times by "an official who believed this post-cold war strategy debate should be carried out in the public domain" {5}.
Contents
1 Doctrine articles {6} 1.1 Superpower status
1.2 US primacy
1.3 Unilateralism
1.4 Preventive Intervention
1.5 Russian threat
1.6 Middle East and Southwest Asia
2 See also
3 References 4 Bibliography 5 External links Doctrine articles {6}
Superpower status
The doctrine announces the US's status as the world's only remaining superpower following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War and proclaims its main objective to be retaining that status.
This was substantially rewritten in the April 16 release.
Our most fundamental goal is to deter or defeat attacks from whatever source ... The second goal is to strengthen and extend the system of defense arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together in common defense against aggression, build habits of cooperation, avoid the renationalization of security policies, and provide security at lower costs and with lower risks for all. Our preference for a collective response to preclude threats or, if necessary, to deal with them is a key feature of our regional defense strategy. The third goal is to preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the re-emergence of a global threat to the interests of the US and our allies.
US primacy
The doctrine establishes the US's leadership role within the new world order.
The US must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. In non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. We must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.
This was substantially rewritten in the April 16 release.
One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying long-standing alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into new cooperative relationships. If we and other leading democracies continue to build a democratic security community, a much safer world is likely to emerge. If we act separately, many other problems could result.
Unilateralism
The doctrine downplays the value of international coalitions.
Like the coalition that opposed Iraqi aggression, we should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the crisis being confronted, and in many cases carrying only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished. Nevertheless, the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the US will be an important stabilizing factor.
This was re-written with a change in emphasis in the April 16 release.
Certain situations like the crisis leading to the Gulf War are likely to engender ad hoc coalitions. We should plan to maximize the value of such coalitions. This may include specialized roles for our forces as well as developing cooperative practices with others.
Preventive Intervention
The doctrine stated the US's right to intervene when and where it believed necessary.
While the US cannot become the world's policeman, by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations.
This was softened slightly in the April 16 release.
While the United States cannot become the world's policeman and assume responsibility for solving every international security problem, neither can we allow our critical interests to depend solely on international mechanisms that can be blocked by countries whose interests may be very different than our own. Where our allies' interests are directly affected, we must expect them to take an appropriate share of the responsibility, and in some cases play the leading role; but we maintain the capabilities for addressing selectively those security problems that threaten our own interests.
Russian threat
The doctrine highlighted the possible threat posed by a resurgent Russia.
We continue to recognize that collectively the conventional forces of the states formerly comprising the Soviet Union retain the most military potential in all of Eurasia; and we do not dismiss the risks to stability in Europe from a nationalist backlash in Russia or efforts to reincorporate into Russia the newly independent republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly others ... We must, however, be mindful that democratic change in Russia is not irreversible, and that despite its current travails, Russia will remain the strongest military power in Eurasia and the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the United States.
This was removed from the April 16 release in favour of a more diplomatic approach.
The US has a significant stake in promoting democratic consolidation and peaceful relations between Russia, Ukraine, and the other republics of the former Soviet Union.
Middle East and Southwest Asia
The doctrine clarified the overall objectives in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.
In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve US and Western access to the region's oil. We also seek to deter further aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect US nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways. As demonstrated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian peninsula. Therefore, we must continue to play a role through enhanced deterrence and improved cooperative security.
The April 16 release was more circumspect and it reaffirmed US commitments to Israel as well as its Arab allies. In the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, we seek to foster regional stability, deter aggression against our friends and interests in the region, protect US nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways and to the region's oil. The United States is committed to the security of Israel and to maintaining the qualitative edge that is critical to Israel's security. Israel's confidence in its security and US-Israel strategic cooperation contribute to the stability of the entire region, as demonstrated once again during the Persian Gulf War. At the same time, our assistance to our Arab friends to defend themselves against aggression also strengthens security throughout the region, including for Israel. See also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_world_order_(politics) References {1} Tyler 1992a. {2} Gaddis 2002, page 52: "Preemption [...] requires hegemony. Although Bush speaks, in his letter of transmittal, of creating 'a balance of power that favors human freedom' while forsaking 'unilateral advantage', the body of the NSS makes it clear that 'our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States. The West Point speech put it more bluntly: 'America has and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge'. The president has at last approved, therefore, Paul Wolfowitz's controversial recommendation to this effect, made in a 1992 'Defense Planning Guidance' draft subsequently leaked to the press and then disavowed by the first Bush administration. It's no accident that Wolfowitz, as deputy secretary of defense, has been at the center of the new Bush administration's strategic planning." {3} Caputo Leiva 2007, page 10. {4} Mann 2004, page 210. {5} Mann 2004, page 210 {6} Tyler 1992b. Bibliography Bush, George W (June 01 2002). "Remarks to the US Military Academy". cfr.org. Retrieved May 12 2013. Gaddis, John Lewis (2002). "Grand Strategy of Transformation". Foreign Policy (133): 50 -57. JSTOR 3183557. Gaddis's essay is reprinted in Paul Bolt, Damon V Coletta, and Collins G Shackleford Jr editors, American Defense Policy (8th edition, 2005). Caputo Leiva, "The World Economy and the United States at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century". Latin American Perspectives 34 (1): 9 -15. doi:10.1177/0094582x06296357. JSTOR 27647989. Tyler, Patrick E. "US Strategy Plan Calls For Insuring No Rivals Develop". The New York Times (March 08 1992). Tyler, Patrick E "Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival' ". The New York Times (March 08 1992). External links * Defense Policy Guidance 1992~1994 * The Making of the Cheney Regional Defense Strategy, 1991-1992 at National Security Archive * Patrick Tyler. US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop: A One-Superpower World, New York Times (March 08 1992). * David Armstrong. Drafting a plan for global dominance, Harper's Magazine (October 2002). * PBS Interview with Barton Gellman on 1992 Defense Policy Guidance. * David Yost. Dissuasion and Allies, Strategic Insights (February 2005). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfowitz_Doctrine https://billtotten.wordpress.com/ https://www.ashisuto.co.jp--- To unsubscribe:
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