what is an outline of "The Black Family:The Ties That Bind" by Angela Davis +2 "The Black Family: The Ties That Bind" (1987), co-authored by Angela Davis and Fania Davis, is a pamphlet published by the Communist Party USA that challenges the widely held Moynihan Report narrative that the Black family is dysfunctional, instead arguing that it is a resilient structure forged in resistance against slavery and ongoing structural inequality.Core Outline and Key Themes:
Critique of the "Matriarchy" Myth: The document critiques the notion that Black women are "too strong" or that matriarchy is the cause of social issues within the Black community. It argues this perspective blames victims rather than addressing systemic racism.Resistance to Slavery: Davis emphasizes that the Black family served as a vital, nurturing space of resistance during slavery, allowing for the preservation of culture and collective survival.Impact of Economic Conditions: The pamphlet highlights that inequalities in economic conditions, employment, and housing—rather than familial structure—are the primary drivers of issues within Black households.Collective Strength: It champions the adaptability and collective nature of the Black family unit, which often extends beyond the nuclear model.The work serves as a political document intended to provide a pro-socialist, feminist, and anti-racist perspective on social policy and family structures.Angela Davis - UCI Libraries"Racism, Birth Control and Reproductive Rights." All American Women: Lines that Divide, Ties that Bind. Ed. Johnnetta B. Cole. New York: Free Press, 1986. 239-2...www.lib.uci.edu<
https://nmaahc.si.edu/object/nmaahc_2010.55.26
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https://www.google.com/search?q=what+is+an+outline+of+%22The+Black+Family%3AThe+Ties+That+Bind%22+by+Angela+Davis&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&hl=en-us&client=safari
The work serves as a political document intended to provide a pro-socialist, feminist, and anti-racist perspective on social policy and family structures.Angela Davis - UCI Libraries"Racism, Birth Control and Reproductive Rights." All American Women: Lines that Divide, Ties that Bind. Ed. Johnnetta B. Cole. New York: Free Press, 1986. 239-2...www.lib.uci.edu
Monday, May 11, 2026
Description
Russia TAKES Iran's Uranium - New Gulf Security Deal COLLAPSES American Influence
I Macgregor
May1
2026
#Lavrov
#ChinaRussia
#WorldNews
For 60 years, Washington shaped the Middle East.
Now, Russia and China
are quietly rewriting the rules - and America never saw it coming.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has executed one of the most significant diplomatic moves in modern geopolitics
— positioning Moscow
as the new indispensable power in Gulf security.
While Washington focused
elsewhere, Russia built a new regional security framework between Iran and
the Gulf Arab states, expanding directly on China's landmark March 2023
Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement that ended 7 years of severed diplomatic relations.
In this analysis, we break down:
• How Russia is systematically dismantling 60 years of American diplomatic primacy in the Middle East
• Russia's dual-track strategy: managing Iran'sbr>
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https://youtu.be/PSlP4w5ATUA?si=QaIkuKXU-HVIu69l <
https://youtu.be/PSlP4w5ATUA?si=QaIkuKXU-HVIu69l
https://youtu.be/y-9xnDVGYF8?si=35rsbJH-w3hAucLt<
<
https://youtu.be/PSlP4w5ATUA?si=QaIkuKXU-HVIu69l <
https://youtu.be/PSlP4w5ATUA?si=QaIkuKXU-HVIu69l
https://youtu.be/y-9xnDVGYF8?si=35rsbJH-w3hAucLt<
US Blockade Didn't Stop China from
Powering Cuba with Solar and Millions in Aid <
Cuba Was Starved for 60 Years - Then China Stepped In For over six decades, Cuba has lived under one of the harshest economic blockades in modern history. Power outages, fuel shortages, collapsing infrastructure, and endless sanctions pushed millions of ordinary Cubans into daily struggle. But when Cuba's energy crisis reached a breaking point, one country chose to act. In this video, we uncover the shocking reality behind the U.S. blockade on Cuba, the devastating oil and electricity crisis that plunged the island into darkness, and how China responded with generators, solar panels, and millions in direct aid. Topics Covered: The history of the U.S. blockade on Cuba • How sanctions triggered Cuba's energy collapse Blackouts, fuel shortages, and humanitarian suffering China's $80 million aid package to Cuba Solar energy projects transforming the island • The geopolitical battle between the U.S. and China in Latin America Why Cuba has become a symbol of resistance <
https://youtu.be/zVmt1rOswyc?si=bAN2GT1nS9VMDFQ6
Cuba Was Starved for 60 Years - Then China Stepped In For over six decades, Cuba has lived under one of the harshest economic blockades in modern history. Power outages, fuel shortages, collapsing infrastructure, and endless sanctions pushed millions of ordinary Cubans into daily struggle. But when Cuba's energy crisis reached a breaking point, one country chose to act. In this video, we uncover the shocking reality behind the U.S. blockade on Cuba, the devastating oil and electricity crisis that plunged the island into darkness, and how China responded with generators, solar panels, and millions in direct aid. Topics Covered: The history of the U.S. blockade on Cuba • How sanctions triggered Cuba's energy collapse Blackouts, fuel shortages, and humanitarian suffering China's $80 million aid package to Cuba Solar energy projects transforming the island • The geopolitical battle between the U.S. and China in Latin America Why Cuba has become a symbol of resistance <
https://youtu.be/zVmt1rOswyc?si=bAN2GT1nS9VMDFQ6
What Really Happened in Iran Was Hidden From the Public| Scott Ritter: America's...
<
https://youtu.be/4XaVZ70gjYw?si=F60HxLVPVWCCd2ww<
What Really Happened in Iran Was Hidden From the Public| Scott Ritter: America's Humiliating Failure 4,020 Likes 77,918 Views 7h Ago #ScottRitter #Iran #Trump What really happened in Iran may be very different from what the public was told. In this video, Scott Ritter argues that America's operation against Iran failed to achieve its real strategic objectives - despite the headlines and political messaging coming out of Washington. Ritter claims key Iranian assets had already been moved, critical infrastructure survived, and the public narrative surrounding the conflict concealed how limited the actual military results were. He warns that the gap between perception and reality could have massive consequences for future U.S.
https://youtu.be/4XaVZ70gjYw?si=F60HxLVPVWCCd2ww<
What Really Happened in Iran Was Hidden From the Public| Scott Ritter: America's Humiliating Failure 4,020 Likes 77,918 Views 7h Ago #ScottRitter #Iran #Trump What really happened in Iran may be very different from what the public was told. In this video, Scott Ritter argues that America's operation against Iran failed to achieve its real strategic objectives - despite the headlines and political messaging coming out of Washington. Ritter claims key Iranian assets had already been moved, critical infrastructure survived, and the public narrative surrounding the conflict concealed how limited the actual military results were. He warns that the gap between perception and reality could have massive consequences for future U.S.
What is Marx’s dialectic? No. 2 passage
"But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. "
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The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisition of the capitalist era: i.e., on cooperation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production. The transformation of scattered private property, arising from individual labour, into capitalist private property is, naturally, a process, incomparably more protracted, violent, and difficult, than the transformation of capitalistic private property, already practically resting on socialised production, into socialised property. In the former case, we had the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers; in the latter, we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people. [2]
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch32.htm <
The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisition of the capitalist era: i.e., on cooperation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production. The transformation of scattered private property, arising from individual labour, into capitalist private property is, naturally, a process, incomparably more protracted, violent, and difficult, than the transformation of capitalistic private property, already practically resting on socialised production, into socialised property. In the former case, we had the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers; in the latter, we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people. [2]
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch32.htm <
What is Marx’s dialectic No. 1 passage
<
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htm
An excellent Russian translation of Das Kapital appeared in the spring of 1872. The edition of 3,000 copies is already nearly exhausted. As early as 1871, N. Sieber, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Kiev, in his work David Ricardo’s Theory of Value and of Capital, referred to my theory of value, of money and of capital, as in its fundamentals a necessary sequel to the teaching of Smith and Ricardo. That which astonishes the Western European in the reading of this excellent work, is the author’s consistent and firm grasp of the purely theoretical position.<
That the method employed in Das Kapital has been little understood, is shown by the various conceptions, contradictory one to another, that have been formed of it. Thus the Paris Revue Positiviste reproaches me in that, on the one hand, I treat economics metaphysically, and on the other hand — imagine! — confine myself to the mere critical analysis of actual facts, instead of writing receipts [4] (Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future. In answer to the reproach in re metaphysics, Professor Sieber has it:
In so far as it deals with actual theory, the method of Marx is the deductive method of the whole English school, a school whose failings and virtues are common to the best theoretic economists.
M. Block — Les Théoriciens du Socialisme en Allemagne. Extrait du Journal des Economistes, Juillet et Août 1872 — makes the discovery that my method is analytic and says: Par cet ouvrage M. Marx se classe parmi les esprits analytiques les plus éminents. [By this work, Mr. Marx ranks among the most eminent analytical minds.] German reviews, of course, shriek out at “Hegelian sophistics.” The European Messenger of St. Petersburg in an article dealing exclusively with the method of Das Kapital (May number, 1872, pp. 427–436), finds my method of inquiry severely realistic, but my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-dialectical. It says: At first sight, if the judgment is based on the external form of the presentation of the subject, Marx is the most ideal of ideal philosophers, always in the German, i.e., the bad sense of the word. But in point of fact he is infinitely more realistic than all his forerunners in the work of economic criticism. He can in no sense be called an idealist.
I cannot answer the writer better than by aid of a few extracts from his own criticism, which may interest some of my readers to whom the Russian original is inaccessible.
After a quotation from the preface to my Criticism of Political Economy, Berlin, 1859, pp. IV–VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:
The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own. ... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx’s book has.
Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?
Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connexion. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction. <
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of Das Kapital, it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Ἐπίγονοι [Epigones — Büchner, Dühring and others] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell. In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary. The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire. Karl Marx London January 24, 1873 Footnotes 1. Geschichtliche Darstellung des Handels, der Gewerbe und des Ackerbaus, &c., von Gustav von Gülich. 5 vols., Jena. 1830–45. 2. See my work Zur Kritik, &c., p. 39. 3. The mealy-mouthed babblers of German vulgar economy fell foul of the style of my book. No one can feel the literary shortcomings in Das Kapital more strongly than I myself. Yet I will for the benefit and the enjoyment of these gentlemen and their public quote in this connexion one English and one Russian notice. The Saturday Review, always hostile to my views, said in its notice of the first edition: The presentation of the subject invests the driest economic questions with a certain peculiar charm. The St. Petersburg Journal (Sankt-Peterburgskie Viedomosti), in its issue of April 8 (20), 1872, says: The presentation of the subject, with the exception of one or two exceptionally special parts, is distinguished by its comprehensibility by the general reader, its clearness, and, in spite of the scientific intricacy of the subject, by an unusual liveliness. In this respect the author in no way resembles ... the majority of German scholars who ... write their books in a language so dry and obscure that the heads of ordinary mortals are cracked by it. 4. Rezepte — translated as “Receipt,” which in the 19th Century, meant “recipe” and Ben Fowkes, for example, translates this as “recipe.” [MIA footnote]. Transcribed by Hinrich Kuhls Html Markup by Stephen Baird (1999)
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htm
An excellent Russian translation of Das Kapital appeared in the spring of 1872. The edition of 3,000 copies is already nearly exhausted. As early as 1871, N. Sieber, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Kiev, in his work David Ricardo’s Theory of Value and of Capital, referred to my theory of value, of money and of capital, as in its fundamentals a necessary sequel to the teaching of Smith and Ricardo. That which astonishes the Western European in the reading of this excellent work, is the author’s consistent and firm grasp of the purely theoretical position.<
That the method employed in Das Kapital has been little understood, is shown by the various conceptions, contradictory one to another, that have been formed of it. Thus the Paris Revue Positiviste reproaches me in that, on the one hand, I treat economics metaphysically, and on the other hand — imagine! — confine myself to the mere critical analysis of actual facts, instead of writing receipts [4] (Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future. In answer to the reproach in re metaphysics, Professor Sieber has it:
In so far as it deals with actual theory, the method of Marx is the deductive method of the whole English school, a school whose failings and virtues are common to the best theoretic economists.
M. Block — Les Théoriciens du Socialisme en Allemagne. Extrait du Journal des Economistes, Juillet et Août 1872 — makes the discovery that my method is analytic and says: Par cet ouvrage M. Marx se classe parmi les esprits analytiques les plus éminents. [By this work, Mr. Marx ranks among the most eminent analytical minds.] German reviews, of course, shriek out at “Hegelian sophistics.” The European Messenger of St. Petersburg in an article dealing exclusively with the method of Das Kapital (May number, 1872, pp. 427–436), finds my method of inquiry severely realistic, but my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-dialectical. It says: At first sight, if the judgment is based on the external form of the presentation of the subject, Marx is the most ideal of ideal philosophers, always in the German, i.e., the bad sense of the word. But in point of fact he is infinitely more realistic than all his forerunners in the work of economic criticism. He can in no sense be called an idealist.
I cannot answer the writer better than by aid of a few extracts from his own criticism, which may interest some of my readers to whom the Russian original is inaccessible.
After a quotation from the preface to my Criticism of Political Economy, Berlin, 1859, pp. IV–VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:
The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own. ... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx’s book has.
Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?
Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connexion. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction. <
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of Das Kapital, it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Ἐπίγονοι [Epigones — Büchner, Dühring and others] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell. In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary. The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire. Karl Marx London January 24, 1873 Footnotes 1. Geschichtliche Darstellung des Handels, der Gewerbe und des Ackerbaus, &c., von Gustav von Gülich. 5 vols., Jena. 1830–45. 2. See my work Zur Kritik, &c., p. 39. 3. The mealy-mouthed babblers of German vulgar economy fell foul of the style of my book. No one can feel the literary shortcomings in Das Kapital more strongly than I myself. Yet I will for the benefit and the enjoyment of these gentlemen and their public quote in this connexion one English and one Russian notice. The Saturday Review, always hostile to my views, said in its notice of the first edition: The presentation of the subject invests the driest economic questions with a certain peculiar charm. The St. Petersburg Journal (Sankt-Peterburgskie Viedomosti), in its issue of April 8 (20), 1872, says: The presentation of the subject, with the exception of one or two exceptionally special parts, is distinguished by its comprehensibility by the general reader, its clearness, and, in spite of the scientific intricacy of the subject, by an unusual liveliness. In this respect the author in no way resembles ... the majority of German scholars who ... write their books in a language so dry and obscure that the heads of ordinary mortals are cracked by it. 4. Rezepte — translated as “Receipt,” which in the 19th Century, meant “recipe” and Ben Fowkes, for example, translates this as “recipe.” [MIA footnote]. Transcribed by Hinrich Kuhls Html Markup by Stephen Baird (1999)