https://youtu.be/iACMj1C5oh8?si=4eWCWwSPXGGyd5ya <


Subsequently, the second Chchin war erupted. Chetchin militants, including Islamic Sunni radicals, recruited individuals connected to ISIS and related extremist organizations before launching attacks inside Russian territory. American intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, actively supported the Chetchin insurgency. This support began on August 7th, 1998. 2 <


days later, on August 9th, Boris Yelten appointed Vladimir Putin as prime minister of Russia. 4 months later at 1
the end of December 1999, Yeltson suddenly resigned and Putin assumed the 1
presidency. <


The sequence was not coincidental. Russian leadership recognized that Western powers had no recognized that Western powers had no intention of forming genuine partnerships with Russia. Instead of inviting Russia into NATO as an equal partner, the West had manufactured Russia as a threatening adversary. This narrative served the interests of the military-industrial complex which required an enemy to justify continued required an enemy to justify continued massive defense budgets. <


Multiple Russian leaders including Boris Yelten and later Vladimir Putin approached American administrations expressing interest in joining NATO as full members. Putin specifically made this overture to President Bill Clinton. The Clinton administration rejected these proposals categorically. <


The fundamental reason for this rejection was straightforward. If Russia had been 1
accepted as a NATO member, NATO would have ceased to possess a logical reason to exist. The entire strategic rationale for NATO's existence postcold war depended upon maintaining Russia as a threatening external adversary. Accepting Russia as a partner would have destroyed the narrative justifying continued military spending, expansion, and weapons procurement. The original purpose of NATO was to prevent Soviet military expansion into Eastern Europe following World War II. However, this original threat had fundamentally changed by the 1990s. The Soviet Union had dissolved. Russian military capacity had contracted dramatically. During the 1990 to 2011 period, Russian military forces declined in absolute size by 2/3, shrinking from 3.5 million personnel to forces declined in absolute size by 2/3, 17:39 shrinking from 3.5 million personnel to 17:42 approximately 1.3 million. The notion 17:45 that Russia posed an existential threat 17:48 to Europe during this period was 17:50 demonstrably false. Yet this false 17:52 narrative became the centerpiece of 17:54 Western strategic doctrine precisely 17:56 because the military-industrial complex 17:59 required such a narrative to justify 18:01 continued spending and expansion. The Soviet Union at the end of World War II 18:06 had responded to repeated historical 18:08 invasions by creating buffer states. 18:11 Russia had been invaded repeatedly, 18:13 three times within approximately 150 18:15 years. The Soviet response of 18:18 establishing buffer states in Poland, 18:20 Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia 18:22 reflected a rational security concern, Russia had been invaded repeatedly, 18:13 three times within approximately 150 18:15 years. The Soviet response of 18:18 establishing buffer states in Poland, 18:20 Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia 18:22 reflected a rational security concern, 18:25 not evidence of aggressive imperial 18:27 ambitions. Western analysts, however, 18:30 reinterpreted this security motivated 18:32 buffer strategy as evidence of communist