I
have a devastating critique of the post-modernist notion of
"anti-essentialism". Post-modernist anti-essentialism is just another
form of neo-Emmanual Kantianism , and falls like all Kantianism to
Materialist critique. I subscribe to materialist women's liberationism .
See Martha Gimenez. Might be termed naturalist women's liberationism.
Based in biological and cultural anthropology.
Charles Brown http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/noframes.html
http://monthlyreview.org/1999/12/01/marxism-human-nature-and-social-change
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Marxism Human Nature, and Social Change
by Martha E. Gimenez
topics: Marxism
Print | Email | PDF
Martha
Gimenez is associate professor of sociology at the University of
Colorado, Boulder. She is the author of numerous essays and contributor
to studies on population theory, Marxist feminist theory, and U.S.
politics of racial/ethnic enumeration. She is founding editor of the
Progressive Sociologist Network (PSN) and Progressive Population Network
(PPN).
Sean Sayers, Marxism and Human Nature (London: Routledge, 1998), 203pp., paperback
At
a time when politicians, academics, and media pundits celebrate the
demise of Marxism as a credible school of thought, and hegemonic
“postisms” (e.g., poststructuralism, postfeminism, post-Marxism) have
succeeded in producing a generation of young academics for whom
everything (themselves included) is “socially constructed” and open to
“deconstruction,” in an endless game of shifting identities and
“stories,” a book about Marxism and human nature seems hopelessly
outdated. It is, however, precisely at this time that this book should
be welcome, not only because it is full of illuminating insights that
dispel many common stereotypes about Marx and Marxism, but also (and
most importantly) because it demonstrates how Marx’s theory of human
nature, and its social and moral implications, offer a necessary
alternative to the current “antinomies of bourgeois thought” (e.g.,
essentialism vs. anti-essentialism; humanism vs. antihumanism;
determinism vs. social constructionism). (I have borrowed this phrase
from Georg Lukacs in History and Class Consciousness.)
Sayers’
aim is to present and defend an historical account of human nature, its
conditions of emergence, development, and fulfillment, and its moral and
social implications. Based on the works of Marx and Hegel, this is an
important contribution to Marxist philosophy and Marxist social science
as well. The substance of his argument is that neither those who negate
the reality of human nature nor those who posit the reality of a
universal human nature offer an acceptable account. Human nature is both
historical (i.e., relative to the mode of production within which it
emerged and develops) and universal, insofar as every mode of production
shapes the world in its own image. As modes of production change, human
nature changes accordingly because “the whole of what is called world
history is nothing more than the creation of man through human labor”
(Marx, cited in Sayers, 4). This is a historical and dialectical
account, based upon Marx’s inversion of the Hegelian dialectics and the
main premises of historical materialism—which states that human beings
are self-produced, active creatures who, by their very nature, are
compelled to transform nature to satisfy their material needs; in the
process of doing so, they change nature and change themselves, producing
and reproducing themselves physically, socially, and intellectually as
they acquire new needs, powers, and capacities.
Labor is at the
very center of this historical and dialectical account of human nature
and, as people develop their powers and capacities through labor, the
conditions under which people work acquire ontological significance as
well. How philosophers and social scientists view labor and its place in
people’s lives shapes their understanding of human nature and their
moral judgements about society.
Those whose conception of human
nature removes it from its historical conditions of possibility become
apologists for the status quo, for they impute to an abstract,
ahistorical, universal human nature the effects (upon human development
and social life) of historically specific oppressive and exploitative
social relations. Marxism, on the other hand, postulates an internal and
essential (rather than external and contingent) relationship between
human nature and its historical context. This is the material basis for
the emergence of values and moral standards suitable for evaluating
modes of production in light of their ability to further or thwart human
development.
The organization of the book reflects these two
aspects of human nature. In the first part, focused on work and human
nature, Sayers sharpens his arguments in the process of critically
assessing utilitarian, hedonist, and libertarian views on human
development and the meaning of work. In the second part, he presents the
Hegelian philosophical foundations of Marx’s method, and the political
and moral implications of Marx’s theory of human nature, exposing the
theoretical and methodological basis for Marxism’s claim to be a
critical theory: i.e., a theory of society that is also a theory of
politics and an ethical outlook.
Against utilitarian and
hedonistic views of human nature that posit human beings as utility or
pleasure seekers, interested only in the quantity of pleasure they can
get, regardless of its source, and J.S. Mill’s critique of this
quantitative approach, which posits a distinction between higher (i.e.,
intellectual) and lower (i.e., physical and sensual) pleasures, Sayers
argues that these views are one-sided and therefore unsatisfactory as
realistic accounts of human nature. Mill’s views in particular, positing
the educated, intellectual, and artistic life above physical or manual
labor and satisfaction of sensual needs, reflect the historical reality
of class societies, in which the division between intellectual and
manual labor rises from—and is continuously reproduced and often
intensified by—the class structure and the social and technical division
of labor. In reality, Sayers argues, both intellectual and manual
labor, the so-called “higher” and “lower” forms of life, are of the
essence of human nature and human activity: people cannot pursue
intellectual endeavors without first satisfying their basic needs and
physical activity, whereas manual labor requires intelligence,
knowledge, and reflection. The division between intellectual and manual
labor is the historical product of the development of the forces of
production in class societies; it reaches new depths today in the
effects of global capitalism on the world’s workforce. The development
of the productive forces creates enormous material and intellectual
wealth and growth of the intellectual and creative possibilities open to
the privileged few, while simultaneously condemning increasingly large
proportions of the population to a life of poverty and, because of
unemployment and underemployment, forced idleness and stunted physical
and intellectual development.
Hedonism and utilitarianism are
also open to criticism, because of their portrayal of people as passive
consumers. This, Sayers points out, is an impoverished view of human
nature that minimizes the fundamental role of labor in human life. True,
labor today is alienating and oppressive for most workers but, under
socialism (a society organized for the satisfaction of human needs
rather than capital accumulation), labor will lose its alien character
and become the source of self-realization for all. Furthermore, Sayers
argues, labor is not the only source of self-realization; leisure is
just as important. Life should include all sorts of activities besides
work, such as fun, recreation, satisfaction of sensual and artistic
needs, and the development of those potentialities not actualized in the
context of work. It is just as one-sided to give primacy to
intellectual over manual labor as it is to assume that human nature can
attain its historically possible levels of development only through
work. Full human development requires the all-around development of our
capacities and powers for work and for enjoyment of our intellectual and
physical potential.
Sayers postulates a dialectic between work
and leisure as a historically developed need that ought to be fulfilled
if people are to attain the development of their powers and abilities.
As
people engage in activities to satisfy their needs, they develop new
skills and knowledge which, in turn generate new needs, new activities,
and further self-development, mastery over their conditions of life, and
self-realization. Given the alienating conditions in which most people
work—for many people, work is simply a means to earn a living while
“real” life begins outside work—it is not surprising that hedonist views
of work as painful deferred gratification, and libertarian views such
as those of Gorz (who argues that people need to be liberated from
work), seem more accurate in their depiction of work than the idea that
there is a need to work. To those who would argue against that notion,
Sayers points out that the concept of alienation presupposes the need to
work which, though denied under capitalist conditions, resurfaces in
the extremely negative effects of unemployment, in people’s eagerness to
develop their creative potential after work, and (as shown in research
findings about people’s attitudes towards work) in people’s reluctance
to give up work even without income loss. The need to work, as we
experience it today, is a historical product of the development of the
forces of production and, concomitantly, the development of human
capabilities and knowledge; that it is historical does not mean that it
is false or unnatural, because all attitudes and feelings towards work
reflect the mode of production and the kinds of constraints and
possibilities it opens up for people. The need to work is an integral
part of human nature as it historically develops through labor.
The
same reasoning applies to leisure. The concept of leisure (as we
understand it today) had no meaning in the past, when leisure was not
the creative space that romantic critics of industry and technology
dream about, but most likely the time to satisfy sensual pleasures and
sleep. The creative use of non-work time is a modern development which,
paradoxically, reflects the need to work; people whose work lives are
less than satisfactory seek fulfillment during their leisure time.
Another manifestation of the need to work is the extent to which people
today (particularly the younger generations) are reluctant to accept
meaningless work just because it is necessary for survival or because
one has a duty to work. The greater the education and skills of the
workforce, the more demanding they are likely to become. But one wonders
how far those demands can go under the conditions imposed by world
capitalism, which allows capital unprecedented freedom and mobility.
Another question that comes to mind is the fate of alienated labor under
socialism and whether the dichotomy between work and leisure will
remain. Sayers postulates the historical emergence of leisure as a need
dialectically related to the need to work, but responding to related
(though somewhat different) concerns. But the need for leisure today
reflects, to a large extent, the deeply alienated nature of most working
conditions, including white-collar and professional work. And,
regardless of future technological advances, we cannot assume that all
necessary but relatively unpleasant or dangerous work will be
eliminated. The contrast between work, no matter how nonalienated, and
leisure or non-work time is therefore likely to remain under socialism,
though attenuated in comparison with present conditions and perhaps
responding more to the demands of our physical nature, rather than our
needs for intellectual self-realization.
The question of women’s
domestic labor is briefly addressed: noting how feminists differ in
their evaluation of domestic work—some reject men’s alienated work and
impute greater value to domestic work, while others find it stultifying
and argue that women need to work and should seek paid
employment—Sayers, agreeing with the latter, argues that women, like
men, experience the need to work. He postulates that this need also
arises from changes in the productive forces affecting all workers under
capitalism. Economic necessity, while indeed an important cause of the
rise in women’s labor-force participation, is not the only (nor the
main) reason why women, including those who could afford to be full-time
housewives, seek employment. Domesticity, given the conditions of life
and growth of human capabilities in the twentieth century, is not a
sufficient source of self-realization for modern women. Besides, the
privatized world of home and family can never compensate for the
alienation of work and the solution is not to retreat into the fantasy
of the “haven in the heartless world,” but to struggle for socialism,
where people can truly develop their powers in a social setting and
where the socialization of domestic work and childcare will thoroughly
change men’s and women’s relationship with each other and to work (178).
Sayers’
arguments rest upon his grasp of Marx’s method; in this sense, his book
is not only about Marxism and human nature but is an object lesson in
how to use Marx’s method to understand human nature and its
implications. Sayers offers a very clear and useful discussion of Marx’s
method in relationship to the philosophical and methodological
significance of Hegel’s often quoted statement, “What is rational is
actual and what is actual is rational” (Hegel, cited in Sayers, 95). For
both Hegel and Marx, there is a unity between actuality (i.e., the
world as it is) and rationality; for both, rationality is not
transcendent but historical, for human reason develops in relationship
to the world; for both, the relationship between actuality and
rationality is dialectical, contradictory, and changing. For Hegel,
however, the rationality of the actual (meaning that actuality is
orderly, patterned, manifesting elements, laws, and tendencies which can
be discerned through scientific study) is at the same time evidence
that rationality is realizing or actualizing itself in the world, so
that what is, is what it ought to be—hence the “mystical shell” covering
the “rational kernel.”
Marx, on the other hand, starts from
actuality or reality and it is on its basis that he explains human
reason, consciousness, and ideas. Marx retains the Hegelian dialectics
of the unity between actuality and rationality (or between existence and
consciousness) but, from the standpoint of historical materialism, it
is existence that determines consciousness. The social world does not
reflect the self-realization or actualization of human consciousness or
human rationality; it is the dynamics of the world itself—its changes,
development, and contradictions—which explain changes in the forms of
consciousness, ideas, and reason.
The unity between actuality and
rationality or, for Marx, existence and consciousness, is a unity in
contradiction such that, as the contradictions in the social world
unfold, people’s experiences and activities change, new needs and
corresponding aspirations, interests and critical ideas, emerge to
challenge previously accepted forms of thought and social relations. As
Sayers points out, before criticism is expressed in ideas “it exists
first of all in fact. Only later it is apprehended by consciousness and
reflected in thought” (109). It follows that when Marx critiques
capitalism and postulates the desirability of socialism, he is doing so
not on the basis of transcendental moral values, notions of justice, or a
transcendental reason, but simply on the basis of the scientific
analysis of its own tendencies and contradictions, as manifested in
changing social relations and forms of consciousness.
Having
established the dialectical nature of Marx’s method, Sayers proceeds to
demonstrate, through the examination of the role of moral values in
Marxism, the problems inherent in attempts to understand Marx’s work
while rejecting its Hegelian roots and, consequently, its dialectical
ontology and mode of theorizing. Analytical Marxists, he argues, achieve
only misunderstandings and misinterpretations when they apply
antithetical, positivist assumptions to Marxism. Marxism’s claim to be
both scientific and political is considered, by Analytical Marxists, a
source of confusion and incoherence. For them, that Marxism historicizes
justice, right, morality, and values entails a hopeless relativism that
makes it impossible to apply those standards outside the system in
which they emerged or to critique the system as a whole (not just
deviations from its laws or value system). From their standpoint,
capitalism can be critiqued, and socialism supported, only on the basis
of ahistorical, transcendental notions of justice, self-realization, and
human development. But it is wrong to divide Marxism into a
value-neutral scientific theory of history, and a political and ethical
outlook based on transcendental values such as, for example, justice and
self-realization (113); these are false alternatives. Dialectically,
Marxism as a theory of history is not incompatible with ethics and
politics; these are not logically independent aspects of Marxism but
integral aspects of its analysis of the capitalist mode of production.
Notions of morality, justice, and fairness (as they emerge within
capitalism) reflect the aspirations, needs, and interests of different
groups and social classes. This is why the critique of capitalism and
the socialist vision do not rest on either relativist or transcendent
notions but on historical notions of morality, fairness, and justice
that reflect the nascent needs, aspirations, and interests of those
classes that are destined to build the society of the future.
Dialectically, morality is a unitypposites; it is always relative to a
given mode of production, but also universal or “absolute” because “in
every stage the essence of man is realized, however imperfectly”
(Bradley, cited in Sayers, 118-119).
There are other important
topics discussed in this small but very rich text, such as the meaning
of progress, the nature of socialism, and the relationship between
alienation and globalization. Those teaching courses on Marxist
philosophy and Marxist theory will find this clear, exceptionally
well-written book an excellent text for graduate students, and a welcome
source for deepening their own understanding of Marx’s method and its
usefulness as a tool for social analysis and political thinking. This
book is particularly useful also for exposing the weaknesses inherent in
the false and rigid theoretical alternatives students are offered in
theory courses today, between the natural and the social, the universal
and the relative, and the essential and the inessential. It is important
to bring back the Marxist alternative, the historical understanding of
human nature and social reality that stresses the dialectical, concrete
unity of the universal and the particular, and the natural and the
social.
Finally, as we near the end of the millennium, while
global capitalism relentlessly tears the world’s communities apart and
qualitative social change seems beyond our reach, it is important not to
have this reminder of key aspects of Marx’s work overshadowed by our
concern with political economy.
It is important to be reminded of
the nature of our human nature, of the role of labor in our
self-realization, and of the dialectical interaction between structural
change, contradictions, and the emergence of new needs, aspirations, and
powers. This book reminds us that, though we live under conditions not
of our own choosing, it is we, in the end, who make history.
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