Russian Science of War vs American Art of War <



Russia has a scientific -historical Worldview; America has a Bigman , Heroic , Artistic ahistorical Worldview <<



For Russia is a Shadow SCIENTIFIC SOCIALIST Republic -the State rules the Rich , unlike the American CAPITALIST Republic , where the Capitalists rule the State . Also, Russia's economic standards are not Ever Growing Private PROFITS. There is no Financial Oligarchy , as in America. Nor is Russia imperialist , in the political-military-economic sense . By negating all these definitive features of imperialism , Russia is a Shadow Socialist Republic . Its Unity with Socialist China speculates a Proletarian Internationalist Human Race .<



Hopefully before I die ( smiles ) <



https://youtu.be/sNkFbQZnKG0?si=GAvEevpu8kCd-Nbv<



Russia doesn't wage war the way the West does and that difference may be deciding the outcome in Ukraine, the Middle East, and now Africa. In this deep-dive episode, Alex Christoforou and Alexander Mercouris are joined by military analyst Stanislav Krapyvnik, fresh from a visit to the Donbas front, for a sweeping breakdown of three simultaneous conflicts and the radically different military doctrines driving them. From Russia's systematic, science-based approach to warfare versus America's personality-driven "art of war," to the reorganization of Russian drone battalions, the gamification of Ukrainian drone kills, and the depletion of US Patriot missile stockpiles in the Iran campaign every thread points to a single uncomfortable conclusion. With Kupyansk fallen, Konstantinovka more than half-captured, and Russian forces just 10 kilometers from Sumy, the question isn't whether the front is moving it's how fast, and what comes after. Watch The Duran's full analysis to understand what the mainstream media 00:04:30 Russia in Mali: African Corps, Wagner successor operations 00:06:00 Russian military philosophy: science of war vs. art of war 00:08:27 How US military doctrine differs flexibility vs. systematic learning 00:09:35 Repeating mistakes: Tora Bora and the limits of personality-driven war 00:12:13 Russian drone adaptation NYT report and real battlefield context 00:20:20 Front-line drone labs: 3D printing and rapid technology cycles 00:30:46 NATO kill tables and inflated Russian casualty counts 00:41:37 Sumy offensive: Russian forces 10km from the city 00:46:41 Iran-US campaign: PAC-3 depletion and what has actually been achieved 00:53:20 Ukraine front update: Konstantinovka, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk fallen 01:00:37 Northeastern Kharkiv encirclement the coming Russian breakout 01:04:41 Anti-drone microwave systems: China's area-effect solution **THE DURAN SHOP** https://theduranshop.com8:04 life. But the approach between the Russian military and the American 8:11 military it is is is very different on a professional level in that the in the US 8:18 it's the art of war and and I think that comes more uh from Clauswitz and and 8:24 that school of thought uh and into the art of war. So what the art of war says is you learn what the great uh you you How US military doctrine differs flexibility vs. systematic learning 8:32 learn what the great un military leaders have done, how they've thought. You try to figure out Napoleon's uh thinking on 8:38 a strategic terror theater tactical level. How US military doctrine differs flexibility vs. systematic learning 8:32 learn what the great uh military leaders have done, how they've thought. You try to figure out Napoleon's uh thinking on 8:38 a strategic terror theater tactical level. Um because it's an art and in the 8:45 end it all depends on the person more so than on the system. Uh the Russian 8:51 approach is the science of war. There's fullmies for this. It's yes the the 8:57 individual uh the individual commander is important. Yesh his abilities are 9:02 very important but those abilitiesvery important but those abilities are built upon a scientific approach. How do you organize logistics? How do you organize defenses? You you don't wing it. You actually have a science behind it. What's worked? What hasn't worked? And because of that the system learn the system is less flexible maybe than uh the the the western system or the American system. Uh but it's very quick at learning lessons. Uh you survive uh any kind of setback. You learn from that setback. You you you you dissect it. You do lessons learned much more so than you do from an American point of view. Lessons learned. Uh you look at it at Repeating mistakes: Tora Bora and lessons learned much more so than you do from an American point of view. Lessons learned. Uh you look at it at Repeating mistakes: Tora Bora and the limits of personality-driven war > 9:40 9:46 9:52 9:59 10:06 10:12 the minimal details of what went wrong and you don't repeat. While from the American side, you may wind up repeating in a slight variation over and over and over again. A prime example uh is uh Bora Bora or is it Torah Torah? I can't remember. I get those two mixed up. The the one in Afghanistan. If you look at what was done when they went after bin Laden in the small mountain range, every single mistake the US military has ever done before, it repeated to and include lessons learned much more so than you do from an American point of view. Lessons learned. Uh you look at it at Repeating mistakes: Tora Bora and the limits of personality-driven war > 9:40 9:46 9:52 9:59 10:06 10:12 the minimal details of what went wrong and you don't repeat. While from the American side, you may wind up repeating in a slight variation over and over and over again. A prime example uh is uh Bora Bora or is it Torah Torah? I can't remember. I get those two mixed up. The the one in Afghanistan. If you look at what was done when they went after bin Laden in the small mountain range,the one in Afghanistan. If you look at 9:59 what was done when they went after bin Laden in the small mountain range, every single mistake the US military has ever 10:06 done before, it repeated to and include if anybody has ever seen u or read the 10:12 book we were soldiers once and young and the movie with u uh let's see who was in 10:17 that that was Bruce Willis. Uh Bruce Willis if I remember correctly, right? 10:23 Who? Yeah, I think so. Well, whichever, right? Uh when uh the 110th I'm sorry 10:29 111st Airborne became 101st Air Assault, so they're helicopter born and what they did was they flew a brigade right into 10:36 the middle of a division of Vietkong uh in a111st Airborne became 101st Air Assault, so they're helicopter born and what they did was they flew a brigade right into 10:36 the middle of a division of Vietkong uh in a valley and they are surrounded now. 10:41 Oh, Mel Gibson. Yeah. Yep. You're right. You're right. You're absolutely right. Mel Gibson. Um so, and what do they 10:48 find? Yes. We have the enemy where we want them. They're all around us. We're around. We can shoot in any direction. 10:53 They're all in there, but so can they. You know that. And that was a catastrophe that barely got saved by the 11:00 sacrifice of a lot of helicopter pilots and and a lot of luck. Uh because the enemy Yeah. they're surrounded uh by the uh by the uh musheen sl al Qaeda whomever else is 11:29 up there. Um every mistake you would think that they would have learned because it goes back more to the 11:35 commander uh than to the science of it. Uh so yes, the US is more flexible, but 11:41 they tend to create a lot of stupid mistakes over and over again because it's it's not learned as a science. 11:47 Uh you know what you do and you don't do uh and the Russian approach is much more systematic. You know, we're supposed to 11:54 be the the uh lowkilled knuckle dragging barbarians uh in according to the 12:00 Western press, but the Russian approach has always been a very technical, very scientific approach to just about 12:05 everything Tharolo a-big asticle whichUh you know what you do and you don't do uh and the Russian approach is much more systematic. You know, we're supposed to 11:54 be the the uh lowkilled knuckle dragging barbarians uh in according to the 12:00 Western press, but the Russian approach has always been a very technical, very scientific approach to just about 12:05 everything. There's a big article which perhaps illustrates this very thing that you ve 12:11 just said. I think it was in the New York Times about Russian adaption to drone warfare and how the Russians um Russian drone adaptation NYT report and real battlefield context 12:19 went have gone about reorganizing their