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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_biology
Philosophy of biology
The philosophy of biology is a subfield of philosophy of science,
which deals with epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical issues in
the biological and biomedical sciences. Although philosophers of
science and philosophers generally have long been interested in
biology (e.g., Aristotle, Descartes, and even Kant ; ALL OF WHOM HAD ATROCIOUS BIOLOGY -CB)philosophy of
biology only emerged as an independent field of philosophy in the
1960s and 1970s. ( See _The Dialectics of Nature _); by F. Engels circ 1885; also J.S.B. Haldane; Christopher Caldwell; )
Philosophers of science then began paying increasing
attention to biology, from the rise of Neodarwinism in the 1930s and
1940s to the discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953 to more recent
advances in genetic engineering. Other key ideas include the reduction
of all life processes to biochemical reactions, and the incorporation
of psychology into a broader neuroscience."
Charles Brown: Most importantly the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis of 1)Darwin's Natural Selection Law; 2) Darwin Law that All Life is Related to All OTHER LIFE THROUGH COMMON ANCESTRAL SPECIES as represented symbolically by Darwin as a Tree of Life; 3) Discovery of DNA as Genes or chemical basis of inheritance ; 4)Discovery of Genetic Mutations , as source of variation within a species
Contents
1 Overview
2 Reductionism, holism, and vitalism
3 An autonomous philosophy of biology
4 Other perspectives
5 Scientific discovery process
6 See also
6.1 Notable philosophers of biology
6.2 Biologists with an interest in the philosophical aspects of biology
7 References
8 Bibliography
9 External links
Overview
The philosophy of biology can be seen as following an empirical
tradition, favoring naturalism. Many contemporary philosophers of
biology have largely avoided traditional questions about the
distinction between life and non-life. Instead, they have examined the
practices, theories, and concepts of biologists with a view toward
better understanding biology as a scientific discipline (or group of
scientific fields). Scientific ideas are philosophically analyzed and
their consequences are explored. It is sometimes difficult to
delineate philosophy of biology as separate from theoretical biology.
A few of the questions philosophers of biology have attempted to
answer, for example, include:
"What is a biological species?"
"How is rationality possible, given our biological origins?"
"How do organisms coordinate their common behavior?"
"Are there genome editing agents?"
"How might our biological understandings of race, sexuality, and
gender reflect social values?"
"What is natural selection, and how does it operate in nature?"
"How do medical doctors explain disease?"
"From where do language and logic stem?
[citation needed]";
"How is ecology related to medicine?
[citation needed]"
A subset of philosophers of biology with a more explicitly
naturalistic orientation hope that biology will provide scientific
answers to such fundamental problems of epistemology, ethics,
aesthetics, anthropology and even metaphysics (even !) Furthermore, progress
in biology urges modern societies to rethink traditional values
concerning all aspects of human life. The possibility of genetic
modification of human stem cells, for example, has led to an ongoing
controversy on how certain biological techniques could infringe upon
ethical consensus (see bioethics). Some of the questions addressed by
these philosophers of biology include:
"What is life?"
"What makes humans uniquely human?";
"What is the basis of moral thinking?";
"What are the factors we use for aesthetic judgments?";
"Is evolution compatible with Christianity or other religious systems?"
Increasingly, ideas drawn from philosophical ontology and logic are
being used by biologists in the domain of bioinformatics. Ontologies
such as the Gene Ontology are being used to annotate the results of
biological experiments in a variety of model organisms in order to
create logically tractable bodies of data available for reasoning and
search. The Gene Ontology itself is a species-neutral
graph-theoretical representation of biological types joined together
by formally defined relations.
Philosophy of biology today has become a very visible, well-organized
discipline - with its own journals, conferences, and professional
organizations. The largest of the latter is the International Society
for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB);
the name of the Society reflecting the interdisciplinary nature of the
field.
Reductionism, holism, and vitalism
One subject within philosophy of biology deals with the relationship
between reductionism and holism, contending views with epistemological
and methodological significance, but also with ethical and
metaphysical connotations.
Scientific reductionism is the view that higher-level biological
processes reduce to physical and chemical processes. For example, the
biological process of respiration is explained as a biochemical
process involving oxygen and carbon dioxide.
Holism is the view that emphasizes higher-level processes, also called
emergent properties: phenomena at a larger level that occur due to the
pattern of interactions between the elements of a system over time.
For example, to explain why one species of finch survives a drought
while others die out, the holistic method looks at the entire
ecosystem. Reducing an ecosystem to its parts in this case would be
less effective at explaining overall behavior (in this case, the
decrease in biodiversity). As individual organisms must be understood
in the context of their ecosystems, holists argue, so must lower-level
biological processes be understood in the broader context of the
living organism in which they take part. Proponents of this view cite
our growing understanding of the multidirectional and multilayered
nature of gene modulation (including epigenetic changes) as an area
where a reductionist view is inadequate for full explanatory power.[1]
See also Holism in science.
Vitalism is the view, rejected by mainstream biologists since the 19th
century, that there is a life-force (called the "vis viva") that has
thus far been unmeasurable scientifically that gives living organisms
their "life." Vitalists often claimed that the vis viva acts with
purposes according to its pre-established "form" (see teleology).
Examples of vitalist philosophy are found in many religions.
Mainstream biologists reject vitalism on the grounds that it opposes
the scientific method. The scientific method was designed as a
methodology to build an extremely reliable understanding of the world,
that is, a supportable, evidenced understanding. Following this
epistemological view, mainstream scientists reject phenomena that have
not been scientifically measured or verified, and thus reject
vitalism.
Some philosophers of biology have attempted to explain the rise and
fall of reductionism, vitalism, and holism throughout the history of
biology. For example, these philosophers claim that the ideas of
Charles Darwin ended the last remainders of teleological views from
biology. Debates in these areas of philosophy of biology turn on how
one views reductionism.
An autonomous philosophy of biology
All processes in organisms obey physical laws, the difference from
inanimate processes lying in their organisation and their being
subject to control by coded information. This has led some biologists
and philosophers (for example, Ernst Mayr and David Hull) to return to
the strictly philosophical reflections of Charles Darwin to resolve
some of the problems which confronted them when they tried to employ a
philosophy of science derived from classical physics. This latter,
positivist approach emphasised a strict determinism (as opposed to
high probability) and to the discovery of universally applicable laws,
testable in the course of experiment. It was difficult for biology,
beyond a basic microbiological level, to live up to these structures.
Standard philosophy of science seemed to leave out a lot of what
characterised living organisms - namely, a historical component in the
form of an inherited genotype.
Biologists with philosophic interests responded, emphasising the dual
nature of the living organism. On the one hand there was the genetic
programme (represented in nucleic acids) - the genotype. On the other
there was its extended body or soma - the phenotype. In accommodating
the more probabilistic and non-universal nature of biological
generalisations, it was a help that standard philosophy of science was
in the process of accommodating similar aspects of 20th century
physics.
This led to a distinction between proximate causes and explanations -
"how" questions dealing with the phenotype; and ultimate causes -
"why" questions, including evolutionary causes, focused on the
genotype. This clarification was part of the great reconciliation, by
Ernst Mayr, among others, in the 1940s, between Darwinian evolution by
natural selection and the genetic model of inheritance. A commitment
to conceptual clarification has characterised many of these
philosophers since. Trivially, this has reminded us of the scientific
basis of all biology, while noting its diversity - from microbiology
to ecology. A complete philosophy of biology would need to accommodate
all these activities. Less trivially, it has unpacked the notion of
"teleology". Since 1859, scientists have had no need for a notion of
cosmic teleology - a programme or a law that can explain and predict
evolution. Darwin provided that. But teleological explanations
(relating to purpose or function) have remained stubbornly useful in
biology - from the structural configuration of macromolecules to the
study of co-operation in social systems. By clarifying and restricting
the use of the term to describe and explain systems controlled
strictly scientifically by genetic programmes, or other physical
systems, teleological questions can be framed and investigated while
remaining committed to the physical nature of all underlying organic
processes.
Similar attention has been given to the concepts of natural selection
(what is the target of natural selection? - the individual? the
environment? the genome? the species?); adaptation; diversity and
classification; species and speciation; and macroevolution.
Just as biology has developed as an autonomous discipline in full
conversation with the other sciences, there is a great deal of work
now being carried on by biologists and philosophers to develop a
dedicated philosophy of biological science which, while in full
conversation with all other philosophic disciplines, attempts to give
answers to the real questions raised by scientific investigations in
biology.
Other perspectives
While the overwhelming majority of English-speaking scholars operating
under the banner of "philosophy of biology" work within the
Anglo-American tradition of analytical philosophy, there is a stream
of philosophic work in continental philosophy which seeks to deal with
issues deriving from biological science. The communication
difficulties involved between these two traditions are well known, not
helped by differences in language. Gerhard Vollmer is often thought of
as a bridge but, despite his education and residence in Germany, he
largely works in the Anglo-American tradition, particularly
pragmatism, and is famous for his development of Lorenz's and Quine's
idea of evolutionary epistemology. On the other hand, one scholar who
has attempted to give a more continental account of the philosophy of
biology is Hans Jonas. His "The Phenomenon of Life" (New York, 1966)
sets out boldly to offer an "existential interpretation of biological
facts", starting with the organism's response to stimulus and ending
with man confronting the Universe, and drawing upon a detailed reading
of phenomenology. This is unlikely to have much influence on
mainstream philosophy of biology, but indicates, as does Vollmer's
work, the current powerful influence of biological thought on
philosophy. A more engaging account is given by the late Virginia Tech
philosopher Marjorie Grene.
Scientific discovery process
Research in biology continues to be less guided by theory than it is
in other sciences.[2] This is especially the case in the context of
life sciences, where the availability of high throughput screening
techniques for the different omics fields and the perceived
complexity, makes the science predominantly data driven. This
data-intensive scientific discovery is by some considered to be the
fourth paradigm, after empiricism, theory and computer simulation.[3]
Others reject the idea that data driven research is about to replace
theory.[4][5] As Krakauer et al. put it: "machine learning is a
powerful means of preprocessing data in preparation for mechanistic
theory building, but should not be considered the final goal of a
scientific inquiry."[6] In regard to cancer biology, Raspe et al.
state: "A better understanding of tumor biology is fundamental for
extracting the relevant information from any high throughput data."
[7]The journal Science chose cancer immunotherapy as the breakthrough
of 2013. According to their explanation a lesson to be learned from
the successes of cancer immunotherapy is that they emerged from
decoding of basic biology. [8]
Theory in biology is less strict formalized as it is in physics.
Besides 1) the classic physics way of mathematical-analytical, there
is 2) statistical based, 3) computer simulation and 4)
conceptual/verbal theorizing/modeling.[9] Dougherty and Bittner state
that in order for biology to progress as a science, it has to move to
more rigorous mathematical modeling, or otherwise risk to be "empty
talk".[10]
In tumor biology research, the characterization of cellular signaling
processes has largely focused on identifying the function of
individual genes and proteins. Janes [11] showed however the
context-dependent nature of signaling driving cell decisions
demonstrating the need for a more system based approach.[12] The lack
of attention for context dependency in preclinical research is also
illustrated by the observation that preclinical testing rarely
includes predictive biomarkers that, when advanced to clinical trials,
will help to distinguish those patients who are likely to benefit from
a drug.[13]
See also
Bioethics
Biosemiotics
Evolutionary anthropology
Evolutionary psychology
Golden Eurydice Award
Mechanism (biology)
Neuroaesthetics
Philosophy of chemistry
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of physics
Philosophy of science
Physics envy
Sociobiology
Notable philosophers of biology
John Beatty
Richard Boyd
Lindley Darden
Daniel Dennett
John Dupré
Carla Fehr
Peter Godfrey-Smith
James R. Griesemer
David Hull
Philip Stuart Kitcher
Tim Lewens
Helen Longino
Jane Maienschein
Sandra Mitchell
Susan Oyama
Alex Rosenberg
Michael Ruse
Sahotra Sarkar
Kristin Shrader-Frechette
Elliott Sober
Kim Sterelny
Alfred I. Tauber
Gerard Verschuuren
William C. Wimsatt
Biologists with an interest in the philosophical aspects of biology
Francisco J. Ayala
Patrick Bateson
Richard Dawkins
Jared Diamond
Michael Ghiselin
François Jacob
Stephen Jay Gould
Richard Lewontin
Humberto Maturana
Ernst Mayr
Jacques Monod
Denis Noble
Joan Roughgarden
Rolf Sattler
John Maynard Smith
Edward O. Wilson
Jonas Salk
References
Jump up ^ Talbott, Stephen L. "Getting Over the Code Delusion". The
New Atlantis.
Jump up ^ Vienna series in theoretical biology
Jump up ^ Hey,T (ed) 2009 The Fourth Paradigm: Data-Intensive
Scientific Discovery
Jump up ^ Callebout, W. (2012). "Scientific perspectivism: A
philosopher of science's response to the challenge of big data
biology". Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and
Biomedical Sciences. Elsevier
Jump up ^ Dougherty, E.R. (2008) "On the Epistemological Crisis in
Genomics" Current Genomics, 9, 69-79
Jump up ^ Krakauer, et al. (2011) "The challenges and scope of
theoretical biology" Journal of Theoretical Biology 276 (2011) 269-276
Jump up ^ Raspe et al. (2012) "Gene expression profiling to dissect
the complexity of cancer biology: Pitfalls and promise"Seminars in
Cancer Biology 22 250- 260
Jump up ^ Couzin-Frankel, J. (2013) "Cancer Immunotherapy" Science 20
December 2013: Vol. 342 no. 6165 pp. 1432-1433
Jump up ^ Pigliucci,M. (2012) "On the Different Ways of 'Doing Theory'
in Biology". Biological Theory. Springer.
Jump up ^ Dougherty, E.R. & Bittner, M.L. (2012) Epistemology of the
Cell: A Systems Perspective on Biological Knowledge. Wiley-IEEE Press,
p. 149 ISBN 978-1-1180-2779-0
Jump up ^ Janes (2005). "A Systems Model of Signaling Identifies a
Molecular Basis Set for Cytokine-Induced Apoptosis". Science.
Jump up ^ Creixell, P. et al. (2012) "Navigating cancer network
attractors for tumorspecific therapy". Nature biotechnology.
Jump up ^ Begley, C. (2012) Drug development: Raise standards for
preclinical cancer research. Nature.
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