Wednesday, April 13, 2022
Lenin Conspectus on Hegel
On Sep 16, 2013, at 9:37 AM, c b wrote:
I am in general trying to read Hegel materialistically: Hegel is
materialism which has been stood on its head (according to Engels) –
that is to say, I cast aside for the most part God, the Absolute, the
Pure Idea, etc.
Lenin, Conspectus of Hegel’s Logic (1914)
Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how
they happen to be (how they become) identical,—under what conditions
they are identical, becoming transformed into one another,—why the
human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as
living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.
Lenin, Conspectus of Hegel’s Logic (1914)
These parts of the work should be called: “a best means for getting a headache!”
Lenin, Conspectus of Hegel’s Logic (1914)
It is impossible completely to understand Marx’s Capital, and
especially its first Chapter, without having thoroughly studied and
understood the whole of Hegel’s Logic. Consequently, half a century
later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!
Lenin, Conspectus of Hegel’s Logic (1914)
Dialectics as living, many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides
eternally increasing), with an infinite number of shades of every
approach and approximation to reality (with a philosophical system
growing into a whole out of each shade)
Lenin, Summary of Dialectics (1914)
Philosophical idealism is only nonsense from the standpoint of crude,
simple, metaphysical materialism. From the standpoint of dialectical
materialism, on the other hand, philosophical idealism is a one-sided,
exaggerated, development (inflation, distension) of one of the
features, aspects, facets of knowledge, into an absolute, divorced
from matter, from nature, apotheosised.
Lenin, Summary of Dialectics (1914)
Human knowledge is not (or does not follow) a straight line, but a
curve, which endlessly approximates a series of circles, a spiral. Any
fragment, segment, section of this curve can be transformed
(transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight
line, which then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads
into the quagmire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is anchored by
the class interests of the ruling classes).
Lenin, Summary of Dialectics (1914)
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/quotes.htm
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/mean10.htm
The Meaning of Hegel's Logic
X: The Dialectical Method
Lenin's "Elements of Dialectics"
Lenin summaries the dialectical method in his Philosophical Notebooks
as follows:
"The determination of the concept out of itself [the thing itself must
be considered in its relations and in its development];
the contradictory nature of the thing itself (the other of itself),
the contradictory forces and tendencies in each phenomenon;
the union of analysis and synthesis".
And in greater detail as follows:
"the objectivity of consideration (not examples, not divergencies, but
the Thing-in-itself).
the entire totality of the manifold relations of this thing to others.
the development of this thing, (phenomenon, respectively), its own
movement, its own life.
the internally contradictory tendencies (and sides) in this thing.
the thing (phenomenon, etc) as the sum and unity of opposites.
the struggle, respectively unfolding, of these opposites,
contradictory strivings, etc.
the union of analysis and synthesis - the breakdown of the separate
parts and the totality, the summation of these parts.
the relations of each thing (phenomenon, etc.) are not only manifold,
but general, universal. Each thing (phenomenon, etc.) is connected
with every other.
not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into
its opposite?].
the endless process of the discovery of new sides, relations, etc.
the endless process of the deepening of man's knowledge of the thing,
of phenomena, processes, etc., from appearance to essence and from
less profound to more profound essence.
from co-existence to causality and from one form of connection and
reciprocal dependence to another, deeper, more general form.
the repetition at a higher stage of certain features, properties,
etc., of the lower and
the apparent return to the old (negation of the negation).
the struggle of content with form and conversely. The throwing off of
the form, the transformation of the content.
the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa (15 and 16 are
examples of 9)".
[Philosophical Notebooks, Volume 38, Lenin's Collected Works, p221]
Lenin's list is as good as any. It might be rewarding to return to
this checklist from time to time while reading Hegel.
One could hardly do better, either, than Marx's famous reaffirmation
of Hegel's gains
Theses on Feuerbach
I
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of
Feuerbach included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is
conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not
as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in
contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed
abstractly by idealism -- which, of course, does not know real,
sensuous activity as such.
Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought
objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective
activity. Hence, in Essence of Christianity, he regards the
theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while
practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical
manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of
"revolutionary", of "practical-critical", activity.
II
The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human
thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man
must prove the truth -- i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness
of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or
non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely
scholastic question.
III
The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and
upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it
is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must,
therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to
society.
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity
or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as
revolutionary practice.
IV
Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-alienation, of
the duplication of the world into a religious world and a secular one.
His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular
basis.
But that the secular basis detaches itself from itself and establishes
itself as an independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by
the cleavages and self-contradictions within this secular basis. The
latter must, therefore, in itself be both understood in its
contradiction and revolutionised in practice. Thus, for instance,
after the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy
family, the former must then itself be destroyed in theory and in
practice.
V
Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants contemplation;
but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous
activity.
VI
Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But
the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single
individual.
In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.
Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence,
is consequently compelled:
To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious
sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract --
isolated -- human individual.
Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as "genus", as an
internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals.
VII
Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the "religious sentiment"
is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual whom he
analyses belongs to a particular form of society.
VIII
All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead
theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and
in the comprehension of this practice.
IX
The highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is,
materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical
activity, is contemplation of single individuals and of civil society.
X
The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint
of the new is human society, or social humanity.
XI
The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the
point is to change it.
Summary
For my part, I have identified the following features of the dialectical method:
The validity of things as moments or stages of development;
Not definitions, but the genesis of a thing;
Knowledge begins with Immediate perception, but all knowledge is
mediated: Being is Nothing;
The objective immanent movement of a thing itself;
Both phenomenon and essence are objective;
Subjection of all concepts to criticism the source of movement and
change is internal to external;
The Conception of a thing as a Unity of Opposites;
The discovery of the internal contradictions within a thing;
Practice is the Criterion of Truth;
Not the Thing or its Other but the Transition between them;
The Absolute is Relative and there is an Absolute within the Relative;
Negation of Negation: the retention of the positive within the negative;
Quantitative change at a certain point becomes qualitative change;
The struggle of form and content, the content is also a form, the
shedding of form and the transformation of content into form and form
into content;
Cause and effect are relative moments, merged and canceled in actuality;
Chance and necessity are relative moments, merged and canceled in actuality;
All that is rational is real, all that is real is rational and all
that is real deserves to perish;
Freedom is the understanding of Necessity;
The truth of actuality is a concept;
Knowledge proceeds from Abstract to Concrete;
The truth is concrete;
Subjectivity is also Objective, objectivity includes the subject;
Analysis and Synthesis are inseparable, the alternation between
synthesis and analysis;
The Means is realised in the End, the End is realised in the Means;
Life is Cognition;
Theory is the comprehension of Practice.
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